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THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS. By Kristin Bumiller.1 Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1988. Pp.
161. $19.95.
William R. Beer 2
In For Whom the Bell Tolls, Ernest Hemingway has his hero,
Robert Jordan, tell of a conversation with a Russian NKVD officer
who sent Jordan on his mission to direct a guerrilla raid. The Russian says that in his homeland there are two kinds of fools, the summer fool and the winter fool. The summer fool walks down the
street on a summer day, grimacing and waving his arms; it is easy
for everybody to see right away that he is a fool. The winter fool
comes to your home on a stormy day, and enters, covered with
snow. He shakes the snow off his boots and removes them. He
shakes the snow off his gloves and removes them. He shakes the
snow off his hat after taking it off, and finally shakes the snow off
his overcoat. Finally he takes off the overcoat and you discover,
only after all that uncovering, that he is a fool.
Professor Kristin Bumiller reminds me of the latter sort of
fool; underneath all the legalistic terminology, Marxist slogans, and
talk about "Foucaultian" analysis and "Beccarian" ideas, hers is a
very simple thesis, to wit: Laws are made by ruling classes, so laws
claiming to reform society really only serve to perpetuate the very
injustices they aim to erase. This is true, she argues, of American
civil rights laws as they apply to blacks, and also of the situation of
any number of other "oppressed" people, such as women, the elderly, Hispanics, and whoever else is the latest victim of the day.
This is the sort of argument that could be made by the average college sophomore who has read The Communist Manifesto.
In order to advance her thesis, she indulges in a breathtaking
perversion of everything that true social science stands for. Science,
in the normally accepted meaning of the term, comprises a search
for general rules of cause and effect through testing of hypotheses
by empirical observation. Professor Bumiller's approach is, by contrast, so biased and selective that it cannot be distinguished from
pamphleteering. In short, the book is an excellent example of Critical Legal Studies, and should be read by anybody who doubts just
I.
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how far removed from reality today's left-wing legal scholars have
become.
"My analysis," says Bumiller, "begins with the assumption
that racism and sexism are prevalent, and is sympathetic to those
who are impatient with the current rate of progress toward a more
egalitarian society." If she is using "discrimination" in the ordinary
sense, her basic assumption is false; a large majority of American
women say they have never suffered from sex discrimination, and
large majorities of blacks say they have never suffered from racial
discrimination in hiring, housing, and education. Of course, one
might surmise that they are wrong, either because they have been
brainwashed or because the discrimination has been veiled in various ways. Such a theory would not necessarily be valid, but it
would at least have a degree of plausibility. But individual experiences of sexual and racial discrimination are not what Bumiller
means when she talks of racism and sexism. What she means-and
in this she is joined by most leftist and liberal social scientists-is
that there are group differences between the situation of blacks and
that of whites, or between that of women and that of men: "discrimination" means inequality.
For example, commentators often cite statistical disparities in
income and occupational mobility between females and males or
whites and blacks. Now, when you start trying to prove things with
statistics, you need some understanding of basic social science
methodology. But Critical Legal Studies exemplars like Bumiller
come crashing into the thickets of sociology without any clear understanding of what they are talking about.
Particularly absurd is her deliberate and repeated confusion of
"women" and "minorities." That women constitute an enormously
heterogeneous category with no internal cohesion is evident to anyone but a polemicist. What does she mean by "minorities"? Does
she include Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans, who have
higher median family incomes than any white ethnic group? Does
she include white ethnic groups such as the Scotch Irish, whose incomes tend to be very modest in comparison to other white ethnic
groups? What she probably means is black Americans and nonCuban Hispanics, lumped together with "women" as some huge oppressed class for propaganda purposes. No honest social scientist
can take this kind of confusion seriously.
Just as serious as Bumiller's conceptual crudity are the factual
errors she makes. The book is chock-full of statements that are erroneous, unsubstantiated, or both. For example, she says that
among groups who experience discrimination, there is "a sense of
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how little things have changed." Any number of surveys provide
objective data indicating that this is simply false. In the 1983 New
York Times Women's Survey, in response to the question, "In the
last ten years or so, do you think men's attitudes towards women
have changed for the better?", 51% of the women responding said
"yes." And 50% said that there had been a "great deal" of progress
"in the movement of women into jobs that used to only be thought
of as only jobs for men." Only 8% said there had been "not much
progress." In a February 1988 Gallup poll, 47% of American
blacks said their work situation had improved in the previous five
years, 54% acknowledged improvement in their pay and 41% in
their housing situation; these perceptions of positive change were
virtually indistinguishable from the figures for whites. It seems evident that the lack of change is more in Bumiller's own mind than in
the minds of those for whom she purports to speak.
She claims that there are "significant gaps in white versus
black or female wages that are due to employers' 'taste for discrimination,' " but the facts are otherwise. When one controls for family
structure, level of education, age, region and urban/rural residence,
the differences in median black and white family incomes virtually
disappear, and this has been so for over a decade. It is commonly
acknowledged nowadays among social scientists that contemporary
racial discrimination does not explain black social problems. As for
male-female differences in income, even the authors of a study that
explicitly sought to demonstrate that discrimination accounted for
differences in male and female wages were forced to concede that
definitive proof was lacking.3
Bumiller's interpretations of data are just as skewed as her
"facts." She tacitly follows a simple rule: Anywhere there is a statistical disparity between a group and some hypothetical national
norm, this is prima facie evidence of discrimination. No other explanation for different levels of achievement between groups is even
briefly considered. If there are fewer blacks in the professions, if
there are more black than white high school dropouts or felons, if
fewer women enter mathematically-oriented occupations, if a certain ethnic group is predominant in a particular field, Bumiller cannot conceive of any other explanation than discrimination. Indeed,
this pattern of thought has become so common in elite thinking that
a statistical disparity is considered to be extremely strong evidence
of discrimination.
Myriad factors besides discrimination can account for these
group disparities. What impelled a group to come to the United
3.

D.

TREIMAN

&

H. HARTMAN, WoMEN, WORK AND WAGES

(1981).

162

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 6:115

States (expulsion, ambition, involuntary servitude), what stage of
economic development our society had achieved when the group
migrated here, what level of education the group had prior to migration, whether or not the group's native language was English,
whether the group was the beneficiary of welfare programs that may
have undermined its communal and familial institutions, whether
its religion encourages or discourages economic enterprise and/or
education-these and many other factors influence the success or
failure of ethnic groups. To be sure, discrimination unfortunately
does play some role in producing statistical disparities between different groups' income levels, but only as one among many factors.
Bumiller attempts to prove her thesis by interviewing several
people and assessing their statements about their experience with
racial or sexual discrimination. This is a time-honored method,
provided that the respondents are chosen in an unbiased way, the
questions put to them are standardized and do not lead them in
preconceived directions, their testimony is presented to the reader
so that he can judge for himself, and no attempt is made to interpret
the data beyond the scope of the experience of the respondents.
Bumiller, however, violates every one of these provisos. Her
sample was deliberately selected to corroborate her own point of
view. "I selected," she says, "a subsample of eighteen persons in
Milwaukee and Los Angeles for in-depth interviewing," out of a
total sample of five hundred sixty people interviewed by a research
enterprise called the Civil Litigation Research Project in 1980.
"The participants in the interviews were representative of those affected by the social inequalities and the pattern of discrimination in
American society: six black and American Indian men." Such a
sample is, of course, "representative" of nothing but Bumiller's own
ideological agenda and, maybe, her travel plans-she says that the
"selection was dependent upon the geographical constraints on the
investigator." Competent social scientists take the notion of a "representative" sample seriously; there are statistical tests for precisely
measuring this characteristic of a sample. Evidently Bumiller is ignorant of these procedures.
Bumiller does not simply interview her subjects; she interprets
their answers for them because "[t]he reality of the subject does not
allow for a social viewpoint distinct from the ideology of those in
authority." To justify this interpolation she claims that the ideology of the ruling class is so pervasive that victims do not know how
to answer questions in such a way as to express their true interests.
Therefore, it is necessary to interpret what her interviewees say in
order to express what they "really" mean. "I attempt to transform
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the act of interviewing from ritual into meaningful exchange by formulating objectives that bring together the knowledge of the respondent with a perspective on legal ideology." Why does she
follow this bizarre procedure? "This work is motivated by the desire to make social science research more responsive to the problem
of social oppression and the stultifying realities of everyday life."
Underneath all the pompous verbiage, the simple fact is that if scientific research doesn't uncover the oppression Bumiller knows is
there, she will add some creative touches to make sure we see it.
All this would be shabby enough. But she then neglects to lay
the full text of her respondents' statements in front of the reader.
Bumiller cannot allow even this highly selected and polemically interrogated sample of subjects to speak for themselves. A phrase or
two is quoted here and there, but the entire transcript of the interviews is digested by the author, and she simply tells us the gist (in
her mind) of what each respondent said. The "victim" isn't allowed
to speak for himself, and the reader isn't allowed to interpret for
himself.
As social science, then, the book is laughable. It can be taken
seriously, however, as an ideological statement, and in this respect it
is instructive. From her point of view the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and its subsequent interpretations and implementations were undesirable because they expressed a reformist promise to the "oppressed" that peaceful change is possible under capitalism. In her
words, "The deep logic of the law does not reflect the complex social reality of discrimination in society, but rather confines legal resolution to social problems appropriate for litigation." This is bad,
because "the legal logic is directed to limiting social transformation
rather than facilitating it." What she prefers is a solution in which
the state intervenes at every level of citizens' lives, abolishing capitalism and bourgeois privacy. In her words, "The public policy tug
of war stretches the line between high and low levels of governmental intervention, yet never questions the basic integrity of the economic market or the reality of personal lives." The policy debate is
too limited because it "assumes that restructuring society to prevent
the reinforcement of hierarchies is impractical or undesirable."
She is right that the civil rights legislation sponsored by welfare
state liberals has been a failure. But the failure has resulted from
methodological and theoretical problems she shares with the same
social engineers whom she attacks. Their intellectual errors have
had grievous social consequences. I will point out only one of
many.
Treating "blacks" and "whites" and "women" and "men" and
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"minorities" as if they were undifferentiated groups rather than individuals is more than just sociologically naive. It has led to the
establishment of a quota system for ethnic groups that pervades
public and private institutions under "affirmative action" guidelines. But the damage is not restricted to racial and sexual quotas.
It extends to the area of Western culture itself. As the recent example of Stanford University shows, left-wing intellectuals are demanding the inclusion of works of women and "people of color" in
courses on Western civilization, not by dint of their intrinsic quality
but because of the race or sex of their authors. The end result is not
simply the balkanization of American society but the balkanization
of Western culture. Henceforth, we may expect that Leonardo Da
Vinci will be subsumed under the category of "gay artist," while
Mme. de Stael will be part of the quota of "women writers." The
value of individual achievement, which is itself the greatest legacy
of the West, is being rapidly wiped out by the civil rights society's
mentality.
One final aspect of the book is also of interest. A revealing
look at the relation between elite institutions and the kind of academic radicalism espoused by Bumiller is provided by her acknowledgement of resources that supported her research. The book is
based in part on a survey carried out by the Civil Litigation Research Project, under the auspices of the University of WisconsinMadison. While she was writing it she was supported by a graduate
fellowship at Madison, by released time at Johns Hopkins University, and as a Liberal Arts Fellow in Law and Political Science at
Harvard Law School. That such establishment institutions should
support her illustrates, if illustration were needed, the extent to
which the intellectual elite in the United States is in thrall to far-left
ideology. It also contrasts grotesquely with her revolutionary
pretensions. It must be tough to keep the stance of brave militant
against the powers that be, when the powers that be are so entirely
accommodating. What is more, that such august agencies should
have supported such mighty labors to produce such a negligible
book is ludicrous.
In summary, there is, as the saying goes among reporters, a
good story here, but Bumiller has not written it. The "civil rights
society" has failed, but not for the reasons Bumiller so murkily argues. The civil rights movement, in surely one of the great moments in American history, succeeded in shaking loose the foul
encrustations of decades of racial segregation throughout the South.
It succeeded so spectacularly that the federal government came to
acknowledge that it had the responsibility to guarantee all citizens
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the right to vote and to use public accommodations. But as soon as
the government bureaucracy was created, something went disastrously wrong, and feminists, leftists, spokesmen for sundry ethnic
constituencies, not to mention homosexuals and others, all leaped
on the "civil rights" bandwagon. The result is a monstrous machinery of preferential treatment, quotas, and discrimination-as-revenge.
The "civil rights society" is a thicket of contradictory and often
incomprehensible legal and bureaucratic regulations that require
everyone-employers, university deans, school admissions committees, and citizens themselves-to classify people on the basis of sociologically dubious categories of oppression. The Rehnquist Court is
trying to change some of this, but it remains to be seen how much
mere judges can do. Given the universities' willingness to employ
the "diversity" subterfuge, and Congress's power to grant outright
racial set-asides, it seems likely that our racial spoils system will
endure.
The end result is to make all Americans far more cynical about
civil rights. Some people have always been successful because they
cut comers and used connections, but now the government itself
explicitly and unashamedly cuts comers and makes connections for
those who come from certain racial groups. Young people today
know that more than ever success is a question of belonging to the
right category-sex, race, ethnic group-and that such stacking of
the decks is not only common but legal. That is the real tragedy
that has resulted from the failure of the "civil rights society," but
the full accounting of that tragedy has not been written.

THE TENTH JUSTICE. By Lincoln Caplan.' New York,
N.Y.: Alfred E. Knopf. 1987. Pp. x, 340. $19.95.
Brian K. Landsberg 2
This is a book with a split personality. Dr. Jekyll provides a
slightly romanticized but basically sound history, description, and
analysis of the role of the Solicitor General. Mr. Hyde transforms
the book into a polemic against the Reagan-era solicitors general,
relying on journalistic techniques popularized by Woodward and
Armstrong in The Brethren. Combining the two detracts from a
generally informative book. One comes to feel the Dr. Jekyll porI. J.D., Harvard Law School.
2. Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Chief, Appellate Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, 1974-1986.

